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Rhythm is an essential and therefore indispensable aspect of all music. Arguably,
rhythmic elements are the most accessible of all the musical elements for clients in music
therapy to produce and manipulate expressively (Hiller, 2011). Yet, theoretical
understanding of rhythm and its use in musical expression is a neglected area of both
music therapy (Bunt, 1994; Daveson & Skewes, 2002) and musicological inquiry
(Gabrielsson, 1993; Kramer, 1988; Mead, 1999). However, the area of psychological
investigation known as “embodied cognition” or “schema theory,” which has been
constructively applied to composed tonal music, may prove fruitful in deepening our
understanding of potential meanings of rhythm in music therapy, particularly in clinical
improvisation.
Aigen (2009) has astutely noted that music therapists must take responsibility for
providing theoretical explanations of the therapeutic meanings of all the musical elements
used in therapy processes. How do we explain a client’s rhythm? Where do a client’s
abilities to use rhythm for self-expression and to relate to others come from? Ansdell
(1997) supports the notion that music therapy and musicology can enhance each other’s
pursuits of knowledge regarding music. Significantly, Aigen (2005, 2009) has been a
leading author in bringing concepts from schema theory to music therapy toward
explaining tonal aspects of clinically improvised music. This chapter seeks to shed light
on the meaning potentials of rhythm in improvisation from the perspective of schema
theory and to briefly highlight implications for improvisational music therapy.
Embodied Cognition and Schema Theory
Musicologists concerned with studying how meanings may be derived from music
experiences have recently embraced concepts from an area of cognitive psychology
variously referred to as embodied cognition, schema theory, or metaphor theory (Brower,
2000; Dogantan-Dack, 2006; Iyer, 2002, 2004; Johnson & Larson, 2003; Krueger, 2009;
Phillips-Silver & Trainor, 2007; Saslaw, 1996; Seitz, 2005; Zbikowski, 1997). (The terms
“embodied cognition” and “schema theory” will be used interchangeably in this chapter
to represent these related models.) Much of the development of this highly significant
perspective on human cognition and language is based on the cognitive science, cognitive
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linguistics, and neuroscience investigations of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980,
1999).
Embodiment theorists posit that humans gain knowledge and comprehension of
the world not from purely thought-based cognitions, as per the Cartesian model (wherein
the mind is the locus of all knowledge and reasoning), but rather from bodily experiences
involved in interacting with the physical world. Cognitive processes used for
comprehending physical interactions include the use of metaphors—linguistic tools that
help an individual categorize experiences from a variety of domains. A metaphor is
commonly used to represent and thus comprehend one thing in terms of the attributes of
another thing. For example, the pile of paperwork on my desk may be described
metaphorically as a mountain—a huge structure that is in my way and that will take a
great deal of time and effort to traverse or conquer, with the word “conquer” also being a
metaphor for completing the task that I perceive as an enemy with whom I must do battle.
Additionally, the metaphors used to comprehend one type of experience are often
mapped onto other types of experiences that have constituently similar attributes, which
is a process known as “cross-domain mapping” (Lakoff, cited in Saslaw, 1996, p. 20).
For example, most adults can recall an experience from childhood of spinning themselves
around until dizzy and disoriented, even to the point of falling to the ground for lack of
balance control. I may map this bodily experience onto my experience of feeling
overwhelmed with having many projects active at one time—each needing my immediate
attention—by stating that my head is “spinning” from the “dizzying” amount of work I
have yet to do. The metaphoric concept or conceptual metaphor takes as the source
domain the embodied action of spinning that results in dizziness and disorientation (a
physical experience) and applies it to a target domain: that of feeling overwhelmed with
many disparate tasks, each requiring immediate attention (a psychological/mental
experience). Humans also use cross-domain mapping to conceptualize experiences of
emotions through metaphors related to embodied knowledge when we describe, for
instance, “falling” in love, feeling “down in the dumps” when depressed, or “flying high”
when feeling great joy or elation.
One powerful aspect of mapping a bodily experience onto another type of
experience through metaphor is that it helps us to categorize our experiences and thereby
gain the ability to draw on previous experiences to understand and respond to new ones.
Another useful aspect of cross-domain mapping is that it enables us to communicate with
others regarding various types of experiences. We are able to draw on our own collective
human bodily experiences, as conceived through conceptual metaphors, to understand
and perhaps empathize with another person’s experience. Recent research has begun to
support the notion that the use of metaphors in everyday understanding of human
experiences is a common and, in many instances, universal phenomenon across cultures
and languages (Narayanan, 1997; Reiger, 1996).
The foundations of our metaphoric concepts are found in what Johnson calls
image schemata (1987). He describes image schemata as “structures that organize our
mental representations at a level more general and abstract than that at which we form
particular mental images” (pp. 23–24). Thus, image schemata are not pictorial
representations of experiences, but are more fundamental. Image schemata are dynamic
constructs formed from bodily experiences in the world of objects and space, and they
represent experiences of interacting with and observing the attributes of objects and other
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people, and of being and moving in space. Further, schemata possess internal consistency
of pattern and form in their construction, aiding in the human proclivity to order and
organize perceptions and responses to a wide variety of experiences in the world. While
preserving a level of consistency, Johnson stresses that image schemata are also dynamic
in nature rather than rigid, inflexible, and literal, and are therefore capable of
accommodating the natural variety of human embodied experiences that occur in
different, perhaps innumerable, contexts (p. 29).
To briefly illustrate, one key image schemata relevant to understanding music
experiences is the CONTAINER schemata. (The convention of using capital letters to
designate specific schemata is common in writings about schema theory and will
therefore be applied in this paper.) A container has a boundary that delimits what is inside
it from what is outside of it. We may understand the concept of a container first through
our bodily experiences of having an inside and an outside to our bodies, and second from
the act of going in and out of, for instance, a house, a room, a store, or an automobile.
The reader may also usefully imagine the CONTAINER schema as represented by a box
or a soup can. Things can be either inside the box or soup can or outside of it. Similarly,
certain actions or events may occur inside a particular container, whereas others typically
occur outside of it. With regard to a musical piece, let us consider a popular song with the
common AABA form. Each section of the form may be considered a container for
particular musical materials and the ways in which the materials are configured. The
musical structures found in the B section are typically organized differently than those in
the A sections that surround it, thus differentiating the sections from one another; each
contains different configurations of the musical materials. The chord progression,
melodic materials, rhythmic structures, and even lyric content that distinguish the B
section are considered “inside” the B section, whereas those that constitute the A section
are “outside” of the B section. However, we may also find a melodic motif from the A
section interpolated “into” the B section. Statements during a rehearsal of the song that
aid musicians in their orientation, such as “we are in the second A section” and “let’s get
through the B section,” allude first to the experience of being inside the A section and
second to the intent of moving through and eventually leaving the B section. Such
directives, conceptualized through the embodied orientation of in-out, are demonstrative
of applications of the CONTAINER schemata that occur quite naturally with regard to
performances of music (Johnson, 1987, pp. 30–37).
How have musicologists contemplated the application of embodied cognition
concepts to rhythm? Dogantan-Dack (2006) reports that current thinking regarding
embodied understandings of musical rhythm has roots in the 19th century within the early
psychology of music theorists. As evidence for this contention, she notes that the earliest
science-based psychology research of the 1800s was, in fact, performed by experimental
physiologists interested in human beings’ psychological experiences of sensations of the
moving body, or kinesthesis. Dogantan-Dack further notes that the early psychology of
music theories regarding rhythm also drew from the experimental physiology research of
the time and therefore applied motor theories to explain the nature of musical rhythm. It
seems apparent that, since the days of the early music psychologists, those interested in
musicology have been seeking answers to questions of rhythm through concepts
surrounding the embodied nature of rhythmic movement (pp. 452–453).
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Conceptualizations of Time in Schema Theory
Most, if not all, definitions of rhythm refer to some aspect of its relationship to
time. So, to understand rhythm, we must first have a clear idea of the nature of time.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) apply concepts from embodiment theories to provide a
detailed rendering of human beings’ conceptualizations of and ways of reasoning about
time, which are steeped in metaphor. The following descriptions are derived from Lakoff
and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to
Western Thought (1999) and Johnson and Larson’s (2003) article “Something in the way
she moves—Metaphors of musical motion” in the journal Metaphor and Symbol.
Time and Events
A human being’s life may be construed as a series of events. Events occur in time.
Every event has a starting point and an ending point. In order to measure the time
properties of an event, humans have devised instruments, such as clocks and stopwatches,
which are based on consistent, cyclical iterations of small events (i.e., seconds) that are
considered equal in their properties. A clock or stopwatch is used to track and categorize
iterations that occur according to the arbitrary system wherein sixty iterations of a second
equals one minute, sixty minutes equals one hour, and so on. Occurrences in succession
of the events known as seconds symbolize an interval of time. Inherent in the notion of
seconds occurring in succession is the inference of movement from one second to the
next and the next, and onward. In fact, it is the movement of a pendulum or springloaded, cycling gears in a clock that produces realizations of time interval events for the
purpose of measurement. The use of a clock or stopwatch allows an event to be measured
from its beginning to its end. Therefore, it seems that we understand time via our
understanding of the properties of events; that is, the time of our lives progresses from
event to event. We also experience moving through the duration of each event.
Subsequently, we measure the time properties of events through comparison with other
events—the consequences being that our experiences of time are integrally linked to our
experiences of events, and our experiences of events are embodied experiences, all of
which occur in some form of space (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 137–139).
Time and Movement in Space
Interestingly, the language we use to conceptualize and reason about time—which
reflects, in essence, our metaphoric thinking about time—takes movement in space as its
source domain. In other words, we map conceptualizations of motion in space onto the
target domain of time. It turns out that our experiences of time are conceptualized in
terms of physical orientation of two sorts: the Moving Times Metaphor and the Moving
Observer (or Time’s Landscape) Metaphor, both of which incorporate the Time
Orientation Metaphor. In the Time Orientation Metaphor, an observer in the present is
faced in a fixed direction, with future time conceived of as being in front of and past time
behind the observer. Examples of language used to describe experiences from this
orientation are “I’m looking forward to the concert,” “look ahead to next week’s
schedule,” “let’s not go back and revisit that issue,” or “those days are behind us now.”
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The Moving Times Metaphor is a conceptualization in which times are an infinite series
of events moving past the observer who is located in the present. The times are oriented
facing the observer, who is oriented facing the future. Therefore, time passes by us or we
experience the passage of time. Linguistic phrases that demonstrate this metaphoric
conceptualization include the following: “time is flying by us,” “our performance date
will arrive soon,” “the due date has passed,” or “here come the staccato sixteenth-note
figures.”
In the Moving Observer (or Time’s Landscape) metaphor, on the other hand, the
observer is not in a fixed location, but rather moves on a path over the landscape that is
conceived of as time, and on which innumerable points of time (i.e., events and/or
structures) are found at different locations. Movement along the path is thus the passage
of time, and the distance traversed is the amount of time that has passed or is yet to be
experienced. Just as in the Moving Times metaphor, the future is conceptualized as being
in front and the past is behind. Linguistic phrases relevant to this metaphoric
conceptualization include the following: “we are fast approaching the scheduled
performance,” “we’ll soon reach the end of the semester,” we’ve passed the cutoff date,”
or “we are coming up on the swing eighth patterns.” With regard to long or short amounts
of time reflected in the metaphoric movement across the time landscape, we might say
any of these phrases: “we have quite a ways to go before we are ready for the recording
session” or “let’s move on quickly from this piece so we can get to the next one on the
list.”
An observation about these two key metaphoric conceptualizations is that they are
figure-ground reversals of each other, depending on what is taken as the moving subject
in a given scenario—either times (events/structures) or the observer (us) (p. 149). This
concept may have relevance for conceptualizations of rhythm in that figure-ground
relationships are found among the various rhythmic elements, particularly those of pulse
and rhythmic figures.
Rhythm Event-Structures
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) summarize their findings regarding time-oriented
metaphors by telling us that human beings use metaphors related to movement in space to
conceptualize time because of our day-to-day bodily experiences moving and physically
interacting with the world. The authors refer to these experiences as “motion-situations”
(p. 151). It seems that we automatically correlate our actions (i.e., motions during motion
situations, or observations of the actions of others) with the time-defining events that
endow us with our sense of time, such as the movement of clocks and our body rhythms.
The authors support their belief in these metaphoric conceptualizations, and the embodied
cognition concepts that undergird them, by explaining that humans “do not perceive time
independently of events. … We can only define time to be that which is measured by
regular iterations of events” (p. 154, italics original). The authors further conclude that,
“Motion-situations thus contain the literal correlations that are the experiential bases for
the Time Orientation, Moving Times, and Moving Observer metaphors” (p. 151).
A conceptualization that I would like to put forth here, and one that seems
important to experiences of rhythm related to time and movement metaphors, is the
notion of rhythmic structures (i.e., rhythmic figures) as rhythm events. For just as distinct
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events such as a party, a business meeting, or a person telling a story have a temporal
shape with a beginning, middle, and end, so too do rhythmic structures, as they are
experienced by people. Therefore, we might, then, speak of rhythmic figures as rhythm
event-structures—that is, temporal structures with a particular form occurring in the
experiential space of time. Rhythmic figures are, simultaneously, events and structures.
(Rhythm event-structure is my own construction and is not related to Lakoff and
Johnson’s [1999, pp. 170–234] event-structure concepts that deal with metaphorical
understandings of causation. My conceptualization of rhythm event-structures is meant to
highlight the duality of a rhythmic figure metaphorically understood as both an event that
occurs over time and a structure akin to a building.)
If we relate the Moving Times and Moving Observer metaphors noted above to
perceptions of rhythmic music, we experience a series of rhythm event-structures. For
example, in the Moving Times metaphor, we experience rhythm event-structures moving
toward us, through or around us (depending on how directly we experience the rhythm),
and eventually past us, whereas in the Moving Observer metaphor, we move toward,
through, and eventually past various other rhythm event-structures. This notion is
demonstrated in the examples of a listener in the Moving Times metaphor who
experiences the approach of staccato sixteenth-note figures and a listener in the Moving
Observer metaphor who is approaching a section of music containing swing eighth
patterns. The staccato sixteenth-note figures and the swing eighth patterns are structures
that we can isolate and describe as distinct, but they are at the same time events that we
experience: as time, in the course of time, and through time. The concept of rhythmic
figures as discrete event-structures is certainly not foreign to musical processes, as
players often isolate particular figures and practice them repeatedly outside of the context
of a musical whole, thereby highlighting the structural unity and independence of each
pattern. Similarly, when improvising, a player may create a new pattern and subsequently
repeat, restructure, embellish, reduce, or expand it in various ways while holding in mind
the distinctive character of the initial pattern as a discrete event-structure with its own
temporal form.
A discrete rhythm event-structure may be a single beat or a rhythmic figure, or
even a rest (e.g., a beat or more of silence) that we as listeners experience as time moves
past us or as we move through it. A rhythm event-structure may also be a pattern that we
re-produce as performers or that we create through improvisation as we move
metaphorically over the landscape of time. From an embodied cognition standpoint, what
differences are apparent in the ways that rhythm is conceptualized within the process of
listening vs. re-creating vs. improvising?
Characteristics of Listeners, Performers, and Solo Rhythm Improvisers
Whereas the “lion’s share” of musicological interest, including that of
embodiment theorists, has historically focused on listeners’ perceptions of music, little
evidence exists for interest in the experiences of improvisers (Gabrielsson & Juslin, 1996;
Juslin & Persson, 2002; Nettl, 1998; Pressing, 1984). Notably, in recent decades
musicologists have begun to focus research on performers’ efforts in expressing aspects
of emotion while performing precomposed works. Interestingly, key machinations that
performers use toward expressing emotion in music have to do with timing, and therefore
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rhythm is clearly implicated in this work (Juslin, 2001; Juslin & Laukka, 2003; Juslin &
Timmers, 2010; Laukka & Gabrielsson, 2000). Yet, a performer of a precomposed work
remains a significantly different subject of study from an improviser. Subsequently, in
seeking to understand improvised rhythm through schema theory, we must consider how
embodiment concepts apply from the vantage point of an improviser compared to that of
a listener or a performer.
Listeners
Johnson and Larson (2003) report that, for music listeners, there are two
perspectives from which to experience music on a landscape: as observer or as
participant. In the observer perspective, the observer-listener remains in place on the
landscape while musical event-structures move past her/him and she/he thus undergoes
and thereby experiences them. Contrarily, in the participant perspective, the participantlistener moves along a path on the landscape of time, undergoing and experiencing
musical event-structures as they are encountered (pp. 72–73). In both perspectives, a
listener may either actively engage in the process or act as a passive subject to it. In both
the observer and participant perspectives, however, a listener plays no role with regard to
creating, sounding, and shaping the nuances of particular musical structures. Also,
whereas a performer plays the role of creating movement while playing, she/he does not
engage in creating musical event-structures, as does an improviser.
Performers
A performer’s perspective is as a participant. A participant does not simply await
musical event-structures as does an observer-listener, but exercises intentionality with
regard to the music sounded and therefore agency in the process of revealing or sounding
the prescribed musical event-structures of the piece. While sounding or giving voice to
composed materials, a performer also has opportunities to individualize the way the
materials are sounded, usually within a certain stylistic range. With regard to musical
agency, Johnson and Larson (2003) distinguish between the metaphorical concepts I am
moved and I move (p. 76). To be moved (“I am moved”) by the music is to be subjected
to musical forces that push or pull us in various ways (p. 75), such as the forces by which
an observer-listener is moved. Interestingly, a participant-listener moves toward the
musical forces found in various musical event-structures of a piece and therefore
experiences moving through them as well. To move musically (“I move”), on the other
hand, is to be the force that causes musical motion or movement. At the most basic level,
a performer, by the act of sounding composed materials from a page, lends human energy
to cause music to be sounded and therefore to move in the music. Yet, at another level, a
performer may exercise agency to shape and consequently aid in moving the music in
individualized ways. This is facilitated through varied use of tempo, dynamics, and
phrasing, while also reproducing the prescribed or composed event-structures of the
composition. At still another level, a performer also hears the sounds and feels her/his
own physical efforts while reproducing musical event-structures, and therefore may also
be moved by the music that is sounded. By possessing energy and a capacity for
intentionality to cause musical motion through human agency, a performer determines
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whether and how musical event-structures are sounded, but not what the nature of each
event-structure is, nor where each is to be located on the unfolding path on the landscape
of musical time, since these are predetermined by the composition itself.
Rhythm Improvisers
Another perspective that has received little attention in the musicological
literature is that of the rhythm improviser. While an improviser’s experience may be
construed as moving over a landscape (like the experiences of a listener-participant or a
performer), the improviser does not encounter structures in particular locations on the
landscape, nor is it the improviser’s role to bring a composer’s musical event-structures
into existence through musical agency. Rather, the improviser creates or brings forth
rhythm event-structures, shapes them, and experiences their unfolding while moving at a
self-generated rate of speed along a self-created path on the landscape of time. The
improviser further responds in an individualized way to the improvised rhythm eventstructures while continuing to create more, until the improvisation ends. In this
perspective, the improviser is the sole agent in a unique cycle of creation, perception, and
reaction. The improviser is the source of energy that initiates improvising, the resource
for establishing and regulating the cyclical or noncyclical nature of the path over which
rhythm event-structures occur (i.e., pulse and tempo), the architect and expresser of all
rhythm event-structures that are formed (i.e., rhythmic figures), and the
supervisor/manager and experiencer of the unfolding processes. In the moments of
creation, along with the role as human agent for bringing sounds into being, an
improviser may also be considered a composer, a conductor, an arranger, an orchestrator,
and an audience to all that occurs in the improvisation.
In-time and Over-time Processes
The improviser’s perspective is one that Iyer (2004) describes as being grounded
in temporality, meaning that the individual (player) is part of an embodied process that
occurs either “over-time” or “in-time” (pp. 160–161). Processes that occur over time are
those that “are merely contained in time; the fact that they take time is of no fundamental
consequence to the result” (p. 161, italics original). Examples of over-time processes may
include composing an orchestral work or writing a song, short story, or novel. In-time
processes, on the other hand, are processes that are “embedded in time; not only does the
time taken matter, but, in fact, it contributes to the overall structure” (p. 161, italics
original). Rhythm improvisation epitomizes an in-time process. A rhythm improviser is a
framer of time—that is, an agent who utilizes the possibilities of time to create timeoriented and time-dependent structures (i.e., rhythmic figures) while moving forward in
time, over the landscape of time, perhaps from one rhythm event-structure to where the
next will be created.
Returning to the Moving Times and Moving Observer metaphors, we note that an
improviser’s time orientation is the same in both perspectives (i.e., the future in front, the
past behind), but her/his nature as the subject of the metaphor is different than that of a
listener or a performer. Again, the Moving Times metaphor places the observer-listener
in a static position and receptive role, detached from the processes of creating or shaping
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the event-structures encountered and undergone, and therefore subject to the music.
Musically, the Moving Times perspective makes logical sense for an observer-listener.
The participant-listener, in Johnson and Larson’s (2003) conceptualization, is also placed
in a receptive role, taking in the preordained structures she/he comes upon and living
through them on the journey over the landscape. Musically, the Moving Observer
perspective makes logical sense for a participant-listener, but also for the experience of a
performer of a composed work. The participant-listener receives the music as she/he
arrives at its location in musical time, whereas the performer reconstructs a composer’s
structures at their prescribed locations.
Compared with a participant-listener or a performer, a rhythm improviser is
indispensably involved in creating, forming, and locating rhythm event-structures as well
as bringing into existence the path on which they occur. A rhythm improviser also
determines the nature and character of the forward movement along the path over the
landscape of time. Due to the unique nature of an improviser’s role, she/he is not simply
an observer, but is a creator as well as an experiencer of the processes. The improviser
creates the experience and consequently also lives through it, along with each event
within it, by taking in the rhythm event-structures (i.e., receiving the auditory and
kinesthetic stimuli of the improvisation) and also by potentially being moved by the
musical constructions and forces. The improviser determines when improvisational time
begins and ends and also how time is marked and organized based on passed embodied
experiences of being and moving in the world or witnessing the movements of objects
and others. Therefore, according to embodied cognition concepts, the ways that pulse,
subdivision, tempo, rhythmic figures, meter, and accents are manifested in creating
rhythm event-structures in improvisations stems from and is constrained by an
improviser’s experiences of bodily movement in space and time.
Schemata Relevant to the Rhythmic Elements in Improvisation
Given the importance of embodiment in recent conceptualizations of music, it is
essential to attempt to describe the various rhythmic elements as they relate to bodily
movement schemata and their associated metaphors, all in the context of improvising.
Musical Pulse and Locomotion
Musical pulse, sometimes referred to as “basic beat,” is the division of time into
equally segmented and equally significant recurring events. Defined in this way, pulse
can be conceptualized by itself, without reference to subdivision, tempo, meter, and
rhythmic figure, and therefore warrants a separate discussion in terms of embodied
cognition constructs. Musical pulse may be understood through a few key schemata that
have to do with locomotion, including those for PATH, VERTICALITY, BALANCE,
CYCLE, GROUNDEDNESS, and GRAVITY.
As bipeds, humans, whose development is beyond infancy, ambulate most often
by walking—a form of locomotion. The left-right-left-right symmetry of the action of
walking is cyclical, like a rhythmic pulse. Simplistically, the machinations of walking
include the legs swinging from the hips in a cycle consisting of one leg swinging forward,
the forward foot striking the ground that supports the weight of the body as it vaults over
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the leg that is now in contact with the earth, while the other leg begins to swing forward
and its foot subsequently strikes the ground, and so on (Farley & Ferris, 1998; London,
2006). As each leg “lifts up” and “returns down” to the earth in the cycle of steps, the
individual experiences VERTICALITY. This process carries the body in a forward
direction on a real or metaphorical PATH, a surface over which movement occurs and
that designates where on the landscape the walker is going, where she/he is, and where
she/he has been. The nature of a walking posture also invokes the VERTICALITY
schemata as the individual experiences the empowerment of being in an upright position,
affording the efficiency of ambulating bipedally rather than by crawling on all fours.
An individual’s legs are most often roughly equal in length, so a walking stride
creates an even rhythmic CYCLE of left-right, left-right—a completed cycle entailing the
execution of a step from each leg. In the process of walking, one foot always remains in
contact with the GROUND; in running, both feet may leave the ground simultaneously,
but they always return. Therefore, when walking (or running), we are, in a sense,
GROUNDED; we are supported, held up, maintained by the ground beneath us. Being
grounded in this way is also a function of the “pull” of GRAVITY—that is, the force of
nature that causes bodies in motion to return to the earth, to the ground. We experience
stability and support in our movement by being regularly connected with the surface over
which we travel, yet we must also assert effort toward maintaining our vertical posture in
the face of gravitational force. The muscular and skeletal movement scheme of walking
(and running) is also cyclical and therefore may be characterized as rhythmic. Therefore,
when walking or running evenly, we may say that we are moving in a rhythmically
grounded fashion (London, 2006).
Along with comprehension of the cyclical movement involved during the
experience of walking, humans also gain understanding of BALANCE. BALANCE, in
this case, is a dynamic concern of equal distribution of weight in various forms
necessitated by the influence of GRAVITY—the natural force that, in essence, pulls
physical objects downward toward the earth. In walking, unconscious adjustments are
continually made in the central nervous system for the weight of the torso, each arm and
leg, and the head, as these pivot over the axis formed by the foot and leg that is in contact
with the ground. BALANCE is, of course, important to the process of remaining upright
(VERTICALITY) so that the cycle of steps may continue as evenly as possible and the
body may therefore move forward in a controlled fashion (Farley & Ferris, 1998).
Given the above explanations of schemata related to walking, I wish to assert that
it is the experience of intentional movement schemes related to locomotion that provide
the basis for a human’s ability to reproduce a musical pulse. Briggs’s (1991) report on
musical development lends further credence to this claim. Her consolidation of findings
from musicologists and music education researchers indicates that a 10- to 14-month-old
child’s ability to intentionally play a steady beat develops concurrently with her/his
ability to walk, with improvement toward mastery of both continuing through the 36- to
72-months period (pp. 10–15). It should be noted that our ability to walk is, of course,
preceded developmentally by the locomotor scheme for crawling, which, once mastered
by an infant, is also a cyclical and therefore rhythmic action. The key to both schemes,
however, is the individual’s intentionality in the process, for it is through her/his
intentional actions in moving in and against the properties of the world that an individual
develops understanding of the nature of stable cyclical patterns of action and the
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associated benefits for well-coordinated locomotion, and eventually for rhythmically
organized music-making.
Walking, it seems, is the most energy-efficient way for a human to ambulate
under her/his own power (Farley & Ferris, 1998). Other locomotion options exist, of
course, such as skipping, galloping, shuffling, hopping, and so on. But with a moment of
thought, we understand that all of these movement patterns require more cognitive and
physical energy of the typically developed human body than does the even, reciprocal
motion of walking. Numerous other rhythmic cycles occur in a functioning human
body—some more even and/or stable than others—such as in sleeping, respiration,
digestion, and menstruation. Historically, musicologists have related musical pulse with
the heartbeat, even naming this essential and most basic rhythmic element after it
(Spitzer, 2004). Yet, rhythmic biological imperatives such as heartbeat and respiration
largely occur unconsciously, with our attention brought to them most often only when
they are not even or stable, such as when affected by physical exertion or by
psychological responses to events (e.g., fright or joyful excitation). If heartbeat were in
fact the true basis for understanding and producing musical pulse, then it seems that
infants would be born with the ability to do so, which is not the case. I contend, on the
other hand, that the conscious and intentional embodied locomotor movement
experiences of walking (and crawling prior to walking) have greater import for the
development of embodied awareness and potential skill in playing pulse than the moreoften-than-not unconscious and unintentional experience of heartbeat. For just as a
musical pulse divides time into equally segmented, equally significant, recurring sound
events or cycles often made explicit when an object interacts with another (e.g., a mallet
striking a drumhead), the process of walking with an even gait requires equally
segmented recurring swings of the legs and feet striking the ground.
The cycles of pulses are balanced, as are steps when walking. Interestingly, the
cadence range (rate of speed) of human adult walking may also be roughly matched to
the typical tempo range of much Western music. Drawing on the work of Fraisse (1982)
and Todd (1994), Iyer (2002) substantiates a similar notion wherein listeners are thought
to comprehend rhythm in music by linking its attributes to that of bodily movement
schemes such as walking. Iyer posits that the relative cadence range of walking (in the
region of 60 to 180 bpm) has a musical correlate in the pulse rates or tempi of a large
portion of Western music. (It is quite likely that other musics of the world similarly draw
from this tempo range; however, no research was identified to support this notion.) More
recently, London (2006) has provided a thorough review of research on measured
relationships between walking cadence range and musical tempi, further sustaining Iyer’s
contentions. Presumably, the correspondence between tempi of Western musics and the
average range of adult walking cadences is not accidental but speaks to the embodied
nature of this indispensible rhythmic element. It also seems logical to assume that, since
listeners are believed to comprehend rhythm through their understanding of bodily
movement schemes, performers and improvisers likely gain this knowledge through
similar means and therefore draw from embodied knowledge when improvising with
rhythm (Mead, 1999).
Musical pulses may function in a figure-ground relationship with rhythmic figures
that, by definition (see below), divide time unequally yet often, but not always, in
mathematical relation to the cycles of the pulse. Similarly, a key attribute of the
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experience of human locomotion, regardless of type, remains being in contact with the
earth; human agents are figures always supported by the ground, always in relationship
with it. And, whereas walking is the foundational scheme for human bipedal locomotion,
rhythmic pulse is the cyclical foundation for the experience of rhythmic movement—that
is, the GROUND over which rhythmic movement is experienced by both performer and
listener. The music theorist Mead (1999) adds support for the notion of a relationship
between walking and musical pulse by reminding us that “qualities of locomotion” as
well as tempo are reflected in familiar music terminology (i.e., tempo markings) (p. 5).
Examples may include agitato (“hurried, restless”), grave (“slow and solemn”), and
andante (“at a walking pace”) (Apel, 1969). Mead (1999) further explains his stance
thusly:
I suspect that further aspects of rhythm also derive from our physical
motion, however. We are extremely sensitive to the differences between
even and odd groups of pulses, whether they be at the level of the beat, its
subdivision, or numbers of bars in a phrase. It strikes me as not
unreasonable to reflect that our sensitivity to this difference is at least in
part derived from our sense of the difference between those cyclic actions
that involve reciprocal motion, such as walking, and those that do not. (p.
5)
It is important to recognize that a rhythmic pulse is often a covert experience for
an improviser rather than explicitly sounded when playing. An improviser may relate
rhythmic playing to an underlying pulse that is created and maintained internally but not
actually played or sounded explicitly. Thaut (2005) refers to the internalization of
rhythmic pulse as a “felt pulse” and notes that other rhythmic actions a player might
construct—regular or irregular—are somehow “referenced and synchronized against
underlying sensations of pulse patterns” (p. 7). Regardless of whether the pulse is
expressly sounded or its perception simply felt, its characteristic grounding aspects,
explained through schema theory, nonetheless impinge on an improviser. These
grounding aspects play a role in the achievement of cyclical movement forward on a path
wherein a gravitational pull toward the ground is experienced, requiring effort to
maintain balance.
Metaphorical linguistic phrases that evidence a link between notions of musical
pulse related to locomotion and the underlying structures of the PATH, VERTICALITY,
BALANCE, CYCLE, GROUNDEDNESS, and GRAVITY schemata may include any of
the following:
- “Here the music settles onto the beat”
- “Louis Armstrong was known for playing just in front of or behind the beat”
- “He laid down a steady beat throughout the entire piece”
- “Her playing was grounded in an even pulse”
- “His wildly expressive playing was ungrounded”
- “The insistent pulse of the bass supported the group’s cohesion”
- “He was able to stand up on his own as a new member of the rhythm section”
Subdivisions

591

Subdivisions are divisions of the time span of musical pulses into smaller, equally
spaced, equally significant events. They may be sounded or manifested as rests.
Subdivisions most often divide the pulse into equal cycles of halves, thirds, fourths,
sixths, eighths, sixteenths, and so on. The origin of any subdivision is the pulse, and
therefore a sense of the underlying or felt pulse is found in subdivisions. This being the
case, a subdivision cannot be separated from its direct relationship to the pulse. A series
of subdivisions may sometimes function similarly to the pulse—for instance, when used
as an ostinato. Notably, subdivisions occur more frequently than pulsations, yet they do
not signal a change of tempo. Pulse and subdivisions share the same temporal and
therefore metaphorical space. In summary, subdivisions fill the time between pulse beats
with more frequent events that are equally significant while also remaining measured
within the same metaphorical space as the underlying pulse beats.
Referring back to the discussion of pulse as related to walking, it seems prudent to
examine whether the same explanatory metaphor of locomotion may hold true for
subdivisions. Key differences between subdivisions and pulse, of course, are the
frequency with which the equally subdivided beats occur and the increased use of
physical and cognitive energy required to produce and organize them.
Pulse and Subdivisions: Walking and Running?
In terms of linking locomotor concepts, it may be tempting to state that, since
pulse is related to walking, then subdivisions relate directly to the act of running.
However, a moment of analysis of walking and running movement schemes suggests
that, within a small range, these two locomotor schemes can, in fact, share a similar rate
of occurrence (also variously referred to as speed, cadence, or, in music, tempo) (London,
2006). Therefore, we might say that walking and running are just two similar
metaphorical ways of articulating or representing a pulse. Yet, whereas walking and
running may potentially share a small cyclical range of cadences, the complexity of
movement involved in each scheme is different, as are the energy requirements of each.
In running, it frequently occurs that both feet simultaneously leave the ground as the
body works against gravity to propel itself both upward and forward, thereby demanding
more coordination and energy than in walking. Hence, the complexity of movement
patterning (coordination and organization) and energy required seems to differentiate
these two locomotor schemes.
A similar relationship seems to exist between the coordination, organization, and
energy requirements of pulse and subdivision playing. Yet, despite these apparent
similarities between walking-running and pulse-subdivisions, an issue that seems to
weaken the link is the metaphorical temporal space required among them, if in fact we
liken metaphorical temporal space to the characteristics of physical space. For unlike the
temporal and metaphoric space necessary for the realization of pulse and subdivisions of
the pulse (i.e., the same temporal and metaphoric space), running, in actuality, typically
moves a person forward over a landscape farther than the scheme for walking over the
same time period, thereby requiring more space or distance to accommodate the result of
running movements. When an individual needs or wishes to move forward quickly,
shifting the movement pattern from walking to running accommodates the energy
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associated with the impulse to move faster. Correspondingly, the feet strike the ground
more frequently but also with greater expanse between them, and more distance is
traversed. It is here with regard to the metaphorical distance covered on the PATH, as
found in the equal relationship between pulse and subdivision playing, that the
metaphorical connection between walking-running and pulse-subdivision seems to lose
explanatory power.
Summarizing the above metaphorical concerns surrounding pulse-subdivisions
and walking-running, we can say of subdivisions that they accommodate an improviser’s
increases of energy from that typically expended by pulse playing. This occurs, however,
without changing the underlying time cycle or the underlying movement scheme (pattern)
of the felt pulse, but also without changing the amount of space on the metaphorical time
landscape that is traversed. Running, on the other hand, while potentially maintaining a
mathematical relationship to an earlier walking cadence such as by doubling or, less
likely but possibly, tripling or quadrupling the rate of previous walking steps, results in
greater distance traveled on a landscape during the same time frame as when walking,
and also expends a greater amount of energy. Thus, the potential metaphorical
relationship between pulse-subdivision and walking-running appears to be violated.
Returning to the schemas noted above relating pulse and walking, namely the
schemas for PATH, VERTICALITY, BALANCE, CYCLE, GROUNDEDNESS, and
GRAVITY, it is the PATH schema that is not accommodated in the attempt to
metaphorically link subdivisions to running. The PATH unfolds over the GROUND of
the felt or actuated pulse. Subdivisions, by definition, relate directly to the grounding
pulse, their realization being part of the pulse, and therefore their manifestation being in
the same time (and metaphorical space) as the pulse. How, then, do we differentiate
subdivision from pulse? What is the embodied nature of subdivisions, and what
metaphorical concepts help in our explanatory pursuit of this rhythmic element?
Subdivisions and Bilateralism
Human walking is a bipedal accomplishment. We are able to walk because we
possess the bilateral structures (left and right legs and feet) that allow it. We are also
bilateral with regard to our upper extremities (i.e., arms and hands) and, as humans, we
are incredibly creative when it comes to the seemingly infinite number and sorts of things
we can do with our bilateral upper extremities. One of these incredible feats is to
subdivide musical pulses into smaller, equally significant units. We typically accomplish
this through variously alternating the actions of our left and right arms and hands. We
might conjecture that this act has historical roots in pre–verbal human language
communication—for instance, when a person sought to communicate with another about
the speed of an animal as it moved nearby, of the rate of flow of a river or storm cloud, or
perhaps about the flow of energy of an emotion. Demonstrating these important “motionsituations” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 151) by striking an object with alternating leftright patterns at different speeds with one’s hands could indeed be considered a creative
and efficient way of nonverbally communicating information about movement and
energy parameters of various phenomena. What I argue here is akin to this idea: Humans’
performance of subdivisions of a pulse is realizable because our cognitive and motoric
capacities allow us to use subdivisions as a means of expressing or communicating
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something about temporal flow parameters of movement and energy. Said another way,
as humans, we take advantage of our embodied understanding of motion-situations and
bilateral upper extremity structures to create subdivisions and thereby express or
communicate about movement and energy.
In summary, I argue above that the comprehension and performance of pulse
playing have their bases in the locomotor scheme of walking. While it may seem logical
to metaphorically relate running to subdivisions of pulse due to certain inherent
relationships—that is, running and playing subdivisions both require increases in
complexity of coordination and energy compared with walking and playing pulse,
respectively—I have shown that the metaphorical relationship eventually fails, for pulse
and subdivision share the same temporal space on a metaphorical PATH, whereas a
runner and a walker, over time, will naturally end up in different places altogether. The
comprehension and playing of subdivisions of pulse is instead argued to be related to the
nature and possibilities of human bilateralism and cognitive abilities (and, perhaps, to a
human’s creative/aesthetic penchant) for coordinating and organizing bilateral
movements. This advantage may be applied in response to a need or desire to express
experiences or observations of motion-situations in the world that occur at various rates
of speed and with varying levels of energy.
Metaphorical linguistic phrases that evidence a link between subdivisions and
expressions of movement parameters of speed and energy are the following:
- “Her playing seemed to have a sense of urgency as her rapid sixteenth-note
subdivisions continued unabated for the duration of the improvisation.”
- “The unhurried feeling experienced earlier in the music returned when he
switched from playing a steady steam of eighth-note subdivisions to half
notes.”
- “While listening to her relentless subdivisions, I had the mental image of
someone trying to hurriedly flee from danger.”
Tempo: Measure of Energy
For any musical pulse to exist and to be recognized by an improviser or listener,
there must always be a measurable rate at which the pulse cycles occur, or a tempo
(London, 2006). Regarding tempo in improvisation, Bruscia (1987) expresses the view
that “Tempo is a gauge of energy, signaling the need to be held up by a ground …” (p.
451, italics added). To define and expand on this notion relevant to improvisation,
consider how when rhythmic playing begins, it evinces an expression of embodied
energy requiring some form of structure on which to emerge and to which other rhythmic
elements or events may potentially relate. Cooper and Meyer (1960) believe that tempo
“is not an organizing force”; rather, that it allows qualification of the rate of speed of the
pulse (p. 3). Tempo is also not something that simply happens when a pulse occurs, but it
is consciously or unconsciously established by an improviser and is one clear revelation
of energy manifested in a music improvisation. Fraisse (1982) reviewed research
indicating that individuals appear to possess a stable “spontaneous” or “personal tempo”
as observed and measured in various empirical movement tests such as measures of
finger-tapping speeds. Related to the above discussion linking pulse and locomotion,
Fraisse also noted that research subjects’ spontaneous tempi were highly correlated with
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the typical range of adult walking cadences (pp. 153–154). Hence, it seems that the rates
at which an improviser plays are individualized and yet relative to her/his experiences of
human bipedal locomotion.
When improvising begins, a pulse cycle also potentially begins, establishing an
overt or covert ground over which other rhythmic events may take place. As noted above,
the tempo of pulse cycles is an indication of the energy expressed moment by moment in
an improviser’s rhythmic playing, and it may change freely according to various dictates
of the player. Summarily, some form of energy must always be implied and applied in
order for initial and subsequent beats to be sounded by a player, for a pulse cycle to be
realized, and for rhythmic expression to be sustained throughout an improvisation.
Returning to the PATH schema, we note that as an improviser moves forward on
a PATH, she/he does so always with a particular amount of energy that influences the
pulse cycles and that manifests as a particular (measurable) rate of speed or tempo. With
regard to rhythmic elements, Bruscia (1987) classified pulse, subdivisions, and tempi of
improvisations as “rhythmic grounds,” and stressed that rhythmic grounds signal a state
of equilibrium without an indication of a goal or other intention. Such energy flow related
to pulse might be characterized as inertia: steady forward movement that remains
unchanged until acted upon by another force. Therefore, when an improviser responds to
an impulse (internal drive or compulsion) to play beats that do not correspond with pulse
beats, the inertia is disrupted and a change occurs in the equilibrium, consequently
signaling a need for resolution (p. 451). It is at this point that a rhythmic figure may be
born.
As noted above, Mead (1999) reports that many of the terms used to describe
tempi—or in composed music, to suggest appropriate tempi—are based on metaphorical
linguistic terms regarding locomotion and/or deportment of locomotion. Above, I
highlighted the examples of agitato (“hurried, restless), grave (“slow and solemn”), and
andante (“at a walking pace”). A review of music theory texts will reveal an abundant list
of similar terms. Other metaphorical phrases that evidence a link between tempo and
qualified energy related to movement or locomotion in improvisations are any of the
following:
- “His tempo evolved from quick and restless to calm and relaxed before the
improvisation was finished.”
- “It became clear that the lumbering tempo established early on in the group
improvisation would not contain the high amount of anxious energy of many
of the members.”
Meter and Accent: Containers and Boundaries
Like tempo, meter is not a sound stimulus that an improviser “plays” as in pulse
beats, sounded subdivisions, or rhythmic figures. Rather, it is a cognitive organizational
tool for sorting rhythmic stimuli into manageable groups or “chunks” to assist in making
the world of time-based musical/rhythmic experiences comprehensible (Lerdahl &
Jackendoff, 1983; Radocy & Boyle, 2003; Thaut, 2005). The concept of “chunking,” first
introduced by Miller (1956), has long been established as a cognitive structuring strategy
for making sense of serial or sequenced bits of information (Gobet, Lane, Croker, Cheng,
Jones, Oliver, & Pine, 2001). When represented on a written score, metrical structures are
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referred to as “measures,” reflecting their function as regular organizational structures.
Each measure holds a specific “measure of time,” that is, amount or number of pulse
beats. Most often in Western music, measures are organized in sets of two or three pulses
and the variety of possible subdivisions of those pulses (Cooper & Meyer, 1960; Radocy
& Boyle, 2003).
From a schema theory standpoint, meter may be conceptualized as a continuous
series of connected CONTAINERS with permeable walls that most often constrain the
amount of rhythmic stimuli permitted inside each container, while at other times allowing
an overflow of rhythmic stimuli to cross over into adjacent containers. Unlike when a
performer re-creates composed music, an improviser “creates” these organizational
containers for her-/himself during the spontaneous act of improvising and reinforces their
conceived existence and function through the use of accents or emphasized beats (Cooper
& Meyer, 1960; Radocy & Boyle, 2003). In this regard, Cooper and Meyer have noted
that an accent “is a stimulus (in a series of stimuli) which is marked for consciousness in
some way” (p. 8, italics original). Consequently, an improviser may play accents as a
means of remaining conscious of the metrical containers she/he has established or to
create rhythmic tension by accenting across metrical boundaries. Whereas a variety of
accent types have been described (see Creston, 1964), Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983)
emphasize accents that reinforce meter, or “metric” accents, and those that function
toward grouping other sorts of rhythmic events, such as rhythmic figures. Concordantly,
in improvisation, accents often are created through the use of physical strength as an
improviser stresses particular beats that land inside the metrical containing structures,
their sound durations fitting inside the container, thereby reinforcing the meter—Lerdahl
and Jackendoff’s metric accent. Accents may also be improvised that permeate the
boundary of a metrical container by prolonging the sound stimulus or creating the
perception that the sound stimulus is prolonged, thereby crossing a metrical container’s
boundary into the next container and potentially disturbing the strength of the metrical
boundaries or walls of the containers. Consistently crossing the boundary may
subsequently alter the regularity of the metrical structure and potentially establish a new
meter with new containers that hold a different measure of time than the previous ones.
Metaphorical linguistic phrases that evidence a link between functions of meter
and the CONTAINER schema include any of the following:
- “Her rhythms landed squarely within the measure.”
- “He broke out of the meter and improvised freely.”
- “She ignored the established meter and played in her own time structure.”
- “The amount of syncopation blurred the boundaries of the meter.”
Rhythmic Figures: Structures and Events
A key metaphorical concept emerges from the musicological literature regarding
the potential embodied nature of rhythmic figures in rhythm improvisation, namely the
architectural notion of rhythmic figures as structures. Along with sound, silence, and
time as materials, the concept of forming or building rhythmic structures includes the
embodied factors of movement and energy in time and space, as well as the related
concept of events in our comprehension of time. We will examine below the defining
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features of rhythmic figures before exploring their conceptualization as structures and
events.
A rhythmic figure, or that which other authors have variously referred to as
rhythm patterns (Bruscia, 1987), rhythmic groupings (Cooper & Meyer, 1960; Lerdahl &
Jackendoff, 1983), “objective rhythmization” (Fraisse, 1982), beat patterns (Thaut, 2005),
or quite generically as “a rhythm,” may be characterized as a division of time into a mix
of equal and unequal beat segments with equal and unequal durations (i.e., long and short
notes) and significances, (i.e., accented [strong] vs. unaccented [weak] beats). The
concept of rhythmic figures infers an ordering of musical time that differs in structural
quality from cyclical pulses or their subdivisions. Cooper and Meyer (1960) define a
rhythmic figure as “the way in which one or more unaccented beats are grouped in
relation to an accented one” (p. 6), a stance similarly held by Lerdahl and Jackendoff
(1983). Cooper and Meyer refer to rhythm as “architectonic” in nature, meaning that the
elements of rhythm, as well as various levels of rhythmic groupings, are used to build or
construct forms in the service of organizing composed tonal music. Fraisse (1982) reports
that in ancient Greek Ionian philosophy, rhythmos commonly meant form, “but an
improvised, momentary, and modifiable form. Rhythmos literally signifies a ‘particular
way of flowing’” (p. 150, italics and internal quotation marks original), thereby
referencing rhythm’s relationship to motion or movement. Consequently, given the
earlier discussion of embodied time conceptualizations, the notions of form and flowing
also draw on the concepts of events and space. Fraisse, who himself reports the nonexistence of an exact and generally accepted definition of rhythm, goes on to relate that
Plato defined rhythm as “the order in the movement,” stressing that the locus of human
beings’ perceptions of rhythm is movement of the human body (p. 150). Fraisse
conceptualizes the basis of rhythmic figures as “Any differentiation in an isochronous
series of identical elements” and notes, as do the other authors mentioned here, that the
differentiation may come from beats having different durations or accents, or from pauses
or rests in the flow of beats (p. 159). Thaut (2005) explains that rhythmic figures may (a)
take the form of either simple subdivisions of a pulse constrained by meter, (b) be quite
complex and highly syncopated but still organized within established metrical structures,
or (c) be asymmetrical in their relationship with a meter or an underlying sense of pulse,
or free rhythms (p. 11). Free rhythms “consist of extended or brief groups of rhythmic
events that are characterized and distinguished from each other by changes in contour,
timing, intervals, durations of sequences, tempo changes, or accent patterns” (p. 11). It
should be noted that, with regard to free rhythms, Thaut refers to the Free Jazz
experimental improvisation movement of the 1960s and 1970s that sought to set aside or
“free” improvisers from melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic structural conventions. (See
Bailey, 1988, for a detailed examination of this movement in improvised music.)
Rhythmic Figures as Event-Structures
It is clear from the above definitions that rhythm involves both structure/form and
movement. From the embodied cognition concepts of time described above, the playing
of rhythmic figures, it seems, also shares characteristics with experiences of human
bodily actions entailing energy and movement through time and space, while also
drawing from embodied understanding of time via events. Whether constrained by or free
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from musical conventions (i.e., some level of pulse and/or metric stability), a rhythm
improviser is an agent who creates or forms distinct rhythmic figures that are different
from pulse beats or sounded subdivisions, while playing. Reflecting on my own
experiences of rhythm improvising and those of my clients and students, it seems that an
improviser may express different intentions when forming rhythmic figures. These
intentions may include manipulating the rhythmic elements and possibilities at one’s
disposal as guided by personal or cultural notions of aesthetic forms of expression, or
communicating in some way with a listener or fellow improviser.
As we seek to describe the process of an improviser manipulating the materials of
time (i.e., rhythmic elements) for aesthetic or personal satisfaction, it seems apt to
metaphorically relate rhythmic figures to an architectural metaphor in that we often
explain that an improviser constructs, makes, creates, generates, shapes, or forms
rhythms while improvising. Other terms used for the creation of rhythmic figures may
include the following: make up, produce, fashion, craft, build, assemble, develop,
compose, or structure. The concept of constructing is an embodied experience that
humans have shared at least since our ancestors began fashioning clothing and shelter
against the elements by using the bilateral and independent capabilities of upper
extremities to manipulate materials into useful forms—indeed, a sort of improvising.
As noted above, rhythmic figures or structures created by an improviser are
formed in time, using time and sounds as materials. Correspondingly, and according to
schema theory, these discrete rhythmic structures are also formed at certain locations on
an unfolding PATH on the metaphorical time landscape and are thus also associated with
our conceptualizations of events. An improviser creates and organizes rhythmic figures,
or what I have referred to as rhythm event-structures, as she/he traverses a metaphorical
PATH. The PATH is highlighted or brought into being through the creation of rhythm
event-structures, for without the formation of rhythm event-structures to mark it as
different from the GROUND, the existence of a PATH on which rhythm event-structures
may occur is unwarranted; the path’s proposed purpose otherwise goes unfulfilled.
Without rhythm event-structures to distinguish a path from the ground, all that exists is
the ground. Rhythmically speaking, to play pulse is to play the GROUND. However,
with the formation of a rhythm event-structure comes the possibility of movement from
one event-structure to another and another, thereby necessitating the existence of a PATH
between them, and with it the innumerable ways that an improviser may move between
each rhythm event-structure. In this regard, we may also reflect on the experience of an
observer or participant-listener who, depending on the tempo of movement via the music,
either experiences the music moving toward and past her/him or moves to and through
the music’s rhythm event-structures at varying rates of speed, thereby having her/his
experience of the event-structures influenced in one way or another.
To summarize, rhythmic figures as event-structures have to do with the embodied
concepts of constructing structures (i.e., rhythmic objects) using time and sound as
materials. Rhythmic figures, being constituently formed of time and space (via the
metaphorical relationship between the two), are distinct with regard to the parameters of
movement and energy they possess. Rhythmic figures are also constructed over the time
of an improvisation, making each also an event (with a beginning, middle, and end) that
the improviser subsequently moves through while creating them and moves away from in
order to construct more rhythmic figures or event-structures. The architectural metaphor
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alludes to the agency of the improviser in the process of building or constructing the
event-structures of the improvisation.
Metaphorical linguistic phrases that evidence a link between improvised rhythmic
figures, events, and metaphorical concepts of architecture may include any of the
following:
- “She built her improvisation by alternating the placement of a one-measurelong and a two-measure-long rhythmic figure.”
- “He formed his rhythmic figures out of staccato sixteenth notes.”
- “Her improvisation was characterized by carefully placed rhythmic figures
assembled in various ways from the common ‘shave and a haircut’ motif.”
Summary: Embodied Cognition, Schema Theory, and
Meanings of Rhythm in Improvisation
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to draw on concepts from the cognitive
science domain known as “embodied cognition” and the related model of schema theory
to explicate a deeper understanding of humans’ proclivities to use rhythm in improvised
musical expressions. The key tenet of embodied cognition is that humans gain
comprehension of the world, and our experiences in it, through bodily interactions with it
and/or through our observations of objects and people moving and interacting in the
world. A key tenet of schema or metaphor theory is that humans’ metaphorical
conceptualizations of interactions with the world provide a means through which we
explain to ourselves our experiences of and in the world—meaning that we aid our
comprehension of life experiences by mapping experiences from one domain onto
another. For example, we may map the bodily experience of running into a large object
(“to crash”) onto the target domain of feeling overwhelmingly tired and needing to lie
down and rest.
Due to the nature of rhythm as a fundamentally time-based experience,
conceptualizations of humans’ psychological experiences of time were examined through
schema theory. Highlighted was the fact that humans’ experiences of time are
metaphorically understood through experiences of moving to and through events in
space; time is understood only through our knowledge of the properties of events,
including our experiences of enduring the ways that events unfold. In this regard,
important schemata for experiences of time were explained. These include the Time
Orientation, Moving Times, and Moving Observer schemata. From analyses of these
schemata, an assertion was made that rhythm shares conceptual aspects with our
experiences of structures found in particular locations on a landscape and also with our
experiences of moving to and living through events, leading to the concept of rhythm
event-structures. With regard to rhythmic improvising, it is theorized that the experience
of creating rhythm structures at varied locations on the metaphorical landscape of time
and the experience of living through each rhythm’s form as an event in time are not
separate.
The experience of a rhythm improviser and thus the ways that rhythm may be
conceptualized from this particular music engagement vantage point was found to differ
considerably from that of a listener or a performer of composed works. In explicating
differences inherent in the role of listener vs. performer vs. improviser, a rendering
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emerged of the multilayered nature of an improviser’s role and the multifarious demands
of the improvisational process. Significantly, a rhythm improviser initiates improvised
sounds through capacities to focus physical energy, motor actions, and cognitive agency
on interacting with instruments. In so doing, the improviser creates rhythm eventstructures as well as the metaphorical path on the landscape of time on which the eventstructures occur or are located. The improviser also experiences applying her/his own
physical and cognitive energies and efforts to organize the resulting sounds that emerge
from the process. An improviser simultaneously appraises the sounds for their value to
the improvisational process while continuing to create and to variously construct
subsequent rhythm event-structures until the improvisation ends.
Thus, the picture emerges of rhythm improvising as a uniquely complex and
sophisticated endeavor that touches upon and draws from numerous aspects of human
functioning. Explaining the nature of the rhythmic materials involved in improvisation,
therefore, requires an orientation capable of accommodating the unique factors
implicated. With this in mind, embodied cognition and schema theory concepts were
brought to bear on explanations of the rhythmic elements of pulse, subdivisions, tempo,
meter, accent, and rhythmic figures used by rhythm improvisers.
Implications of Embodied Cognition Theory for Improvisational Music Therapy
Foundational thinking on implications of schema theory for music therapy can be
found in Aigen’s (2005) Music-Centered Music Therapy text and Journal of Music
Therapy article titled “Verticality and containment in improvisation and song: An
application of schema theory to Nordoff-Robbins Music Therapy” (2009). Paramount in
Aigen’s theoretical view of music therapy is that “all aspects of melody, harmony,
rhythm and meter, and texture that constitute one’s clinical-musical interventions should
have an underlying rationale” (2009, p. 242). Toward fulfilling the mandate understood
in this proposition, Aigen advocates the importance of embodied cognition theories “as a
tool in integrating musical content with the extra-musical clinical concerns that
characterize the focus of music therapy” (p. 244). Other significant implications for the
use of embodied cognition theories in music therapy are in how clients’ functional
capacities are revealed through their participation in various forms of musicking,
including improvising. Aigen (2005) notes that relevant image schemata can provide an
informative link between a client’s life experiences inside and outside of music, that the
metaphorical language used to describe music and musical experiences is useful toward
gaining insight into music and its importance in clinical processes, and “that image
schemata are not just of cognitive importance but also represent basic emotional,
psychological, and developmental needs and aspirations of human beings” (pp. 178–179).
Aigen also concludes that a key benefit of musical engagement revealed through
embodied cognition theory is the compensatory nature of metaphorical understandings
gained through musicking for clients whose disabilities limit their access to the cognitive,
emotional, psychological, and developmental benefits of directly engaging in moving and
physically interacting in the world (pp. 201–202).
Forces
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In the findings described earlier regarding applications of embodied cognition
theory to rhythm improvising, I noted that, at a foundational level, a rhythm improviser
initiates and then maintains efforts in improvising sounds through embodied capacities to
focus physical energy, bodily action, and cognitive agency on the processes of interacting
with instruments. We may say, then, that in order for any rhythm improvisation to occur,
there must be application of some form of force in the process of moving one’s body with
and against instruments. Johnson (1987) tells us that any action or interaction among
objects and/or people implies the presence of forces (p. 42). The embodied experiences of
human beings, as we move through the world and interact with objects and each other
moment by moment, may thus be viewed as a series of force interactions or relationships
(p. 45).
Forces, we are told, evince certain general characteristics that are immediately
related to embodied understandings. Among these characteristics are the following: (a)
Humans’ basic awareness of forces is made evident through our experience of
interactions. Johnson emphasizes, “There is no schema for force that does not involve
interaction, or potential interaction” (p. 43); (b) Force is most often related to the
movement of an object in a particular direction through space; (c) An object in motion
usually follows a singular path; (d) Every force is derived from some source or origin
(therefore, due to the directionality of forces, agents may manipulate forces toward a
particular purpose or goal); (e) The strength, power, or intensity of a force is variable and
is in many instances measurable; and (f) Since forces are evidenced through interactions,
“there is always a structure or sequence of causality involved” (p. 44, italics original)—
“Forces are the means by which we achieve causal interactions” (p. 44). Johnson holds
that the characteristics just described constitute image schemata or Gestalt structures for
all forces. Further, our metaphoric understandings of actions, interactions and therefore
events, including improvising with rhythm, are conceptualized through the same image
schemata. Johnson also asserts that image schemata, such as those for FORCES related to
interactions and events, are implicated in the way meanings and inferences are developed
(pp. 44–45). What sorts of force Gestalt structures may be identified in rhythm
improvising, and how might FORCE schemata be useful to a music therapist toward
understanding and working with a client’s improvised rhythm? (For detailed expositions
on the nature of tonal forces, see Aigen [2005, 2009], Johnson & Larson [2003], and
Larson [1997, 1998].)
Johnson (1987) describes the following four general types of FORCE Gestalt
structures or relationships that may bear on the processes of rhythm improvising:
Compulsion, blockage, counterforce, and diversion. These structures may provide
conceptual foundations for music therapists toward comprehending a client’s improvised
rhythm in both solo and co-improvisation situations. In solo improvising, a client
generates, coordinates, and responds to improvisational and rhythmic forces of her/his
own, whereas in co-improvisation, client and therapist both generate, coordinate, and
respond to their own and each other’s improvisational and rhythmic forces. Improvisers’
playing may also be influenced in response to aesthetic, emotional/psychological, and
physical forces rather than to purely musical ones. It therefore becomes possible for a
therapist to witness and infer from a client’s rhythmic improvising aspects of embodied
experiences and understandings in relationship to self, to the world, and to others (Aigen,
2005). The therapist may also actively explore and subsequently work in treatment with a
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client’s responses to various types of forces through use of clinical-musical techniques.
With regard to implications for improvisational music therapy, I will variously highlight
related concepts from the IAPs formulated by Bruscia (1987, pp. 403–496), analytical
music therapy (Priestley, 1994), and Nordoff and Robbins’s (2007) creative music
therapy models. I will also draw on notions related to the 64 clinical techniques found in
Bruscia (1987, pp. 533–557).
Compulsion
Given the above characteristics of forces, we may note that any force that results
in real or potential action must have a point of initiation from which it begins, or a
compulsion that then moves with a certain intensity in a particular direction along a path
(Johnson, 1987). For a rhythm improviser, the compulsion or urge to play may have its
origin in the impulse to create sound. The impulse may stem from, for example, an
emotion, an aesthetic idea, or a need or desire to enact a physical expression of energy or
to communicate with another. In such cases, the improviser may say that she/he is moved
to play. Johnson emphasizes that without compulsion, an assertion of force will not
occur. Therefore, at the most basic level, a client must experience an impulse from which
a movement or action might be initiated and, whether aware or not of the impulse, must
also be capable of responding to it with some form of action upon an instrument.
When a therapist witnesses the force of compulsion in a client’s rhythm
improvising, a sense of particular aspects of the client’s immediate functioning in various
domains may be gained. First, the presence of pulse in an improvisation is indicative of
the client’s experience of time (which is understood via movement in space) and the
capability of cognitively and motorically organizing it or organizing self in relation to it.
If pulse is present, the therapist may also infer something about the level of energy
inherent in the client’s ongoing impulses through the tempo and/or use of subdivisions.
Further, with the presence of pulse, the therapist may note the occurrence of metrical
organization and therefore something of the client’s organization or coordination of
expressive impulses. The immediate presence of rhythmic figures in an improvisation,
while inherently indicating relationships to pulse/subdivisions, tempo, and meter (i.e., the
organized flow of energy in time), may further provide for a therapist a more complex
view of the client’s experience of her-/himself as an agent who, in turn, comprehends the
self as an agent who moves in time through various events and participates in creating,
structuring, and experiencing events in the world. In other words, a rhythm improvisation
that uses the widest range of rhythmic materials available reveals immediately the
broadest perspective of the improviser’s cognitive, motor, and psychological functioning
in that moment. When pulse is not present in a client’s initial playing, on the other hand,
a therapist may note that the compulsion to create sound has revealed a force in response
to an impulse. However, the nature of the impulse will indicate quite different meaning
potentials having to do with a lack of organization in the client’s motoric, cognitive, or
emotional/psychological realms of experience or combinations therein. According to the
IAPs (Bruscia, 1987), in response to a client’s initial improvised offerings (i.e., her/his
compulsion), a therapist may begin to assess through the variability profile the range of
stability or instability or change with regard to the client’s use of tempo, meter, and
rhythmic figures toward later interpreting potential meanings (pp. 427–433). Further, the
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therapist may be drawn to listen through the congruence profile as the client’s use of
tempo, subdivisions, and/or meter may exhibit differential relationships to each other as
revealed through tensions among these rhythmic grounding and organizing elements.
For Nordoff and Robbins (2007), witnessing a client’s compulsion in
improvisation is related to the concept of the music child that is described as
…that entity in every child which responds to musical experience, finds it
meaningful and engaging, remembers music, and enjoys some form of
musical expression, communication, and sharing. The music child is
therefore the individualized musicality inborn in every child: The term has
reference to the universality of human musical sensitivity—the heritage of
complex and subtle sensitivity to the ordering and relationship of tonal and
rhythmic movement—and to the uniquely personal significance of each
child’s musical responsiveness. (p. 3)
Hence, to witness the compulsion of an improvisational impulse is to witness the
manifestation of the music child’s impulse to engage musically with the world. (It should
be noted that the concept of the music child is not limited to children with disabilities, but
applies equally to all improvisers [Aigen, 2005].) For Nordoff and Robbins, most
improvisational experiences are co-created between client and therapist. Therefore, a
client’s impulse to create sound may stem from a need or desire to respond to the
therapist’s sounds as well as from her/his own internal expressive or communicative
impulses. Toward comprehending a client’s rhythmic expressions, a therapist working in
this model first assesses the nature of the client’s compulsion by attending to the
rhythmic character and quality of intentionality in the sounded impulse, with a particular
focus on pulse beating stability (p. 298). With the overarching aim of rhythmically (and
therefore interpersonally) connecting and relating with the improviser, Nordoff and
Robbins highlight the significance of pulse playing as an embodied experience in the
following statement: “Two individuals responding to the pulse together are experiencing
the most universally natural way of finding mutuality in being physically active to music”
(p. 298).
Blockage
Moving and therefore interacting in the world is not always a clear and
unrestricted process, for we encounter obstacles or blockages along our paths,
necessitating a redirection of our forces to circumvent the blockage. According to
Johnson (1987), we do this by going around, over, or through the blockage, or else we
must simply stop. In this regard, we may hear such metaphoric phrases related to
circumventing a blockage if one can only work around an issue or get over a hurdle or
through a bottleneck. It seems that there is evidence of intelligence and creativity in a
human’s process of determining how to get around a given blockage, as many options
may be at one’s disposal. Such is the case for a rhythm improviser. Let us explore the
types of blockages that may occur in rhythm improvising.
The blockages that a rhythm improviser may encounter exist in the form of intraand interpersonal experiences as well as intra- and intermusical experiences. For instance,
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a solo rhythm improviser is always vulnerable to the intrapersonal-intramusical auditory
feedback loop while creating and responding to the improvised sounds. As a client
improvises and hears the improvised sounds, she/he may become aware of emotional
energies and related associations underlying the expressions. Should the client be
resistant to emotional awareness and the feeling implications of the emotion, the client
may consciously or unconsciously alter the forces that are entailed in the character of the
current improvising toward avoiding the emotion. The feedback the client thus receives
changes, and she/he may then move along in the improvisation unhampered by the
emotional blockage. An example of an interpersonal blockage may have to do with the
authenticity in a client’s improvising. This may be the case when a client recognizes that
the improvisation may reveal something about her-/himself that she/he wishes to conceal
from the therapist. In reacting to this potential blockage, she/he may consciously alter the
forces inherent in her/his rhythmic expressions in an attempt to hide the aspect in
question from the therapist while continuing to improvise. Along these lines, Priestley
(1994) writes of similar instances of clients attempting to hide or avoid revealing aspects
of themselves, but with a focus on implications regarding unconscious processes as
viewed psychoanalytically. Priestley refers to these events as types of resistance
occurring in a client’s improvising and/or verbal processing of improvisations and
leading to what she terms a resistance vacuum wherein a client unconsciously avoids
revealing, feeling, and/or addressing certain emotions and any related cognitive materials
via music, thoughts, or words (pp. 181–185).
A third example that crosses intra- and interpersonal as well as intramusical
perspectives is when an improviser recognizes being somehow limited (i.e., is blocked)
by the sensorimotor challenges required in improvising and how she/he or a listener may
feel about it. Here the improviser may seek to form a particular expressive structure
related to an aesthetic idea or one that suits an emotional expressive intent in the moment
but is limited in doing so due to physical constraints (e.g., lack of mastery on an
instrument). In attempting to create a particular structure, the client may misplay the
figure and hence consider it a failure of sorts. To avoid feeling inadequate, the client may
repeat the misplayed figure as if it were intended and thereby circumvent the blockage
while continuing to improvise via more physically accessible materials (i.e., simpler
rhythmic structures). By altering the forces inherent in playing and thereby moving on to
using less challenging materials, the client avoids feeling her/his own or the therapist’s
judgment of adequacy/inadequacy.
In the above scenarios, types of blockages in a solo rhythm improvisation are
metaphorically linked to combinations of a client’s intra- and interpersonal
emotional/psychological functioning, to sensorimotor capabilities, and/or to intramusical
responses based on aesthetic concerns. As noted for the compulsion schemata, a therapist
listening through the framework of the IAPs in the above scenarios may find significance
in the variability profile, noting the client’s tempo, meter, and rhythmic figure playing as
musical/rhythmic forces are altered in response to real or perceived blockages (Bruscia,
1987, pp. 427–433). The therapist may also note points of tension in the improvised
music as the variations occur over time and as alternate rhythmic materials, played in
order to bypass a given blockage, are found incongruous with tension levels in the
materials that preceded them (pp. 437–441).
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Instances of blockage that occur via intermusical interactions depend on different
types of forces than the scenarios just described. In the case of co-improvisation, client
and therapist are vulnerable to each other’s rhythmic forces as each player forms
rhythmic materials in the improvisational situation. Here we refer to forces that are
inherent in the sounds or tones of a rhythmic utterance. We find support for the concept
of musical forces in the work of Zuckerkandl (1956), who held that musical tones,
including the sounds that constitute rhythmic expressions, “are conveyors of forces”—
and that “Hearing music means hearing an action of forces” (p. 37).
Nordoff and Robbins (2007) have noted that, depending on the level of
awareness, emotional status, and factors related to development and pathology, a client
might be more or less susceptible to the effects of certain musical forces in the therapist’s
improvised offerings. In the Tempo-Dynamic Schema (pp. 317–321), various extreme
qualities of a client’s use of tempo in beating—labeled Condition-Determined playing—
are described according to the ways in which they inhibit or block musical
communication with the therapist relative to a more “normal musical experience” (p.
318). In Scale III: Musicing (pp. 419–430), a client’s instrumental rhythmic responses to
aspects of the therapist’s structured rhythmic materials, including pulse, tempo variations,
and rhythmic figures, are assessed. Various condition-determined disorders in a client’s
rhythmic improvising may be considered blockages of the client’s musically free and
responsive playing. In particular, Nordoff and Robbins identify categories of potential
blockages, including Perseverative, Compulsive, Reactive, and Undirected/Unaware
beating, each of which a client may exhibit in the presence of the therapist’s
improvisational sounds, that is, in the presence of the therapist’s rhythmic forces.
Consequently, the authors have also sought to develop musical techniques through which
a client’s condition-determined improvising may become more freely directed and
relational with the therapist’s (p. 316). As the therapist attempts to alter a client’s playing
through various techniques, the client may be nonresponsive and continue on her/his
current beating path. In this case, we might say that the client does not respond by
bypassing the blockage at all, but rather drives directly through it without evidence of
being at all influenced by the therapist’s musical forces. According to the IAPs, a
therapist might focus examination of the improvisation through the autonomy profile.
Here the therapist may find that, due to the client’s resistance (or lack of awareness) to
being influenced by a co-improviser’s sounds, the client avoids taking a certain type of
role in the relationship (Bruscia, 1987, p. 447).
Counterforce
The impact of a counterforce is that it stops the progress of another force, as if a
head-on collision of forces occurs (Johnson, 1987). Counterforces in solo rhythm
improvising may take a similar form to blockages, depending on the improviser’s
interpretation of the force relative to her/his own musical/rhythmic forces and according
to the client’s proclivity to respond to such force relationships. For instance, a solo
rhythm improviser, when faced with the same sorts of intra- and interpersonal scenarios
as described above related to the blockage force schemata, may respond not by seeking a
way to get around or through a potential blockage, but rather by interpreting the blockage
as a force equal to her/his own improvisational activity and hence responding to its
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impact by ceasing to play. This is not an uncommon experience, as humans have many
times described the experience of metaphorically being stopped in one’s tracks or halted
in one’s progress for some reason. Therefore, a rhythm improviser may interpret and
respond to intra- and interpersonal sorts of forces as counterforces. The client may
similarly respond to intra- and intermusical forces. For example, the client may be
confused, frustrated, or overwhelmed by the nature of her/his own improvised sounds or
those of another improviser and respond by ceasing to improvise, perhaps not knowing
how to continue or feeling incapable of doing so.
A therapist listening through the IAPs may hear the halted improvisation process
through the integration profile as an over-differentiation of a client’s playing in
relationship to her/his previous playing, that is, the client’s use of improvised sounds vs.
no sounds. Using the autonomy profile (which infers co-improvising), the therapist may
also note that the stopped improviser has chosen to resist, avoid, or obliterate the
development of any leader-follower relationship within the improvisation (Bruscia, 1987,
pp. 444–449). Nordoff and Robbins (2007), on the other hand, note in Scale II: Musical
Communicativeness that a client’s failure to maintain improvisational efforts has to do
with, for example, being noncommunicative with the therapist, lacking intentionality and
control in improvising, and/or using instruments in an infantile manner (p. 401).
Diversion
In the case of diversion, two forces converge, not head-on as is the case of a
counterforce, but from alternate angles, thus sending at least one of the forces in another
direction or trajectory and onto a new path, as in a ricochet effect (Johnson, 1987). Such
causal interactions occur frequently through the course of our daily experiences as we
approach situations that challenge our extant forces and purposes and cause us to be
moved in a different direction, with a new aim or goal and perhaps also with a different
attitude or energy. In rhythm improvising, a player may be diverted by her/his own
sounds as she/he hears, evaluates, and responds to them in the course of playing.
Depending on the impact of factors related to aesthetics, emotions, and/or physical
sensations experienced while playing, the improviser may be diverted, or moved, to make
adjustments. For example, the client may alter the nature of the tempo, meter, and or
rhythmic figures as the improvisation unfolds or alter the manner in which the rhythmic
elements are articulated. Diversion by aesthetic factors entails responding to musical
forces in accordance with the event-structures that the improviser creates and
experiences. Alternatively, the impact of emotional factors related to the improvised
rhythm may mean diverting one’s playing in response to memories and/or associations
elicited and/or to symbolic interpretations of the rhythm’s character that cause the
improviser to change the course and perhaps the character of the rhythmic materials. And
finally, as an improviser experiences the physicality of the forces of movement involved
in improvising, she/he may be moved to change the nature of the enactments performed
against the rhythm instruments. A therapist may again find the variability profile of the
IAPs to be of significance while hearing and seeking to understand the nature of the
client’s diversions of tempo, meter, and rhythmic figures within solo rhythm
improvisations (Bruscia, 1987, pp. 427–433). The therapist may also consider the
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character of the new material as it relates to the rhythmic sounds that preceded it, in
accordance with the congruence profile (pp. 437–441).
In co-improvising—along with potentially being diverted in response to one’s
own aesthetic, emotional, and physical factors—an improviser also may experience the
impact of the other participant’s improvised rhythmic materials and/or the other
participant’s personhood, as between a client and therapist. In some models of
improvisational music therapy, therapists often assess the ways that clients respond
musically/rhythmically to particular musical offerings, with the assessment information
subsequently providing guidance to the therapist’s responses in treatment, such as in
creative music therapy (Nordoff & Robbins, 2007). A resource that also provides great
clarity regarding the notion of diversion via musical forces in clinical co-improvisation is
the taxonomy of 64 clinical techniques compiled by Bruscia (1987, pp. 533–557), and in
particular the 25 purely musical techniques that are implemented through a therapist’s
improvisational efforts. Bruscia defines a clinical technique as “an operation or
interaction initiated by the therapist to elicit an immediate response from the client, or to
shape her/his immediate experience” (p. 533). Not all of the 64 clinical techniques are
musical in nature. Some are verbal, some are structural or environmental, and some are
procedural. I will describe here a few examples of musical techniques, referred to as
“Redirection Techniques,” which are expressly designed to divert a client’s improvising
in a particular manner and which have immediate relevance for rhythm improvising (p.
545). For instance, the technique of Introducing Change entails the therapist introducing
new material such as rhythmic figures into a co-improvisation with the aim of helping the
client take her/his improvisation in a different direction than its current course (p. 545).
The technique titled Differentiating may be initiated when a client’s improvisational
tendency is to emulate or merge with the therapist’s rhythms and thereby avoid taking an
individualized and independent role or expressing from the client’s own impulses. In
Differentiating, the therapist improvises rhythmic materials that are clearly distinct and
contrast with the client’s sounds, with the aim of causing the client to change the nature
of her/his rhythmic playing and thereby recognize her/his own identity in the music as
separate from the therapist’s (pp 545–546). Lastly, the technique of Intervening is used
by a therapist to disrupt or break into a client’s perseverative or fixated rhythm
improvising. The goal of the technique is to provide the client with a stimulus to change
the inflexible or obsessive course and/or character of the client’s playing. For example, a
therapist may use strong syncopations or cross rhythms to destabilize the client’s
perseveration in a metered context (p. 547).
Summary: Embodied Cognition and Improvisational Music Therapy
With the long-held philosophical and musicological belief in a direct relationship
between rhythm and human experiences of movement, it seems natural to seek
understandings of improvised rhythm from embodied cognition theories. Application of
schema theory to improvisational music therapy draws on the fundamental idea that,
when an improviser plays on or interacts with rhythm instruments, certain FORCES are
enacted. Further, interactions with instruments result in other forces to which a player
becomes susceptible. These include (a) the forces of improvised sounds and the physical
forces of a improviser’s own actions with and upon the instruments played; (b) the
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psychological forces of memories, associations, emotions, and aesthetic ideals that the
sounds may elicit; (c) the forces inherent in the interpersonal relationship with a listener
or co-improviser (i.e., therapist); and (d) the musical forces that a co-improviser may
enact. Finally, we can relate these particular forces with a group of Gestalt structures
considered universally characteristic of the ways that all forces interact in the world.
These include the schemas for compulsion, blockage, counterforce, and diversion.
When improvising rhythms and both product and process point to the client’s
metaphoric understandings of her-/himself as an agent on the world (i.e., self-perception),
an embodied cognition perspective seems most relevant to guide clinical decisionmaking. As Aigen (2005) emphasizes regarding the application of schema theory to
music therapy, part of the benefits for clients may be the opportunities that music
provides for having experiences that compensate for the sorts of experiences that fully
functioning persons have and that clients, due to certain limitations, cannot provide for
themselves—a type of therapeutic helping that Bruscia (1998) refers to as “redress” (p.
68). Hence, in improvisational music therapy within a schema theory orientation, the
therapist might address a client’s need to experience the variety of forces that are
available in music experiences that the client may otherwise not be able to access.
Last, from an embodied cognition perspective, a therapist can begin to
comprehend the meaning of a client’s rhythm by comparing the client’s rhythms and the
client’s process of improvising to her/his own metaphorical understandings of embodied
movement and/or emotional energy movement. In listening to or co-improvising with a
client, a therapist might use her/his own experiences of forces related movement
schemata as points of comparison to understand the client’s rhythm or to challenge the
client in various ways toward helping the client gain experiences with and abilities to
respond to certain types of forces. For clients whose abilities to move and/or physically
interact are limited, experiences of rhythmic movement provided by the therapist in coimprovising might be used to compensate for the client’s limited experience and to
therefore bring to the client opportunities to deepen understanding of the various forces in
the world, among which are the client’s own.
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